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focusing on the case of the Basque Country. The presence of externalities in tax administration 
attributable to the costs of terrorism is investigated by undertaking a theoretical analysis. The 
findings of this are tested using Spanish data extracted from repeated surveys and other sources. 
By employing ordered response models, evidence is found of the negative impact of terrorism 
on tax enforcement as it is perceived by residents in the Basque Country and Navarre. In 
particular, this impact is found to be stronger for entrepreneurs and liberal professionals. No 
significant impact is found for individuals resident in the rest of Spain.   
 
MAIN RESULT: This study provides evidence of the fact that the tax administrations of the 
Basque Country and Navarre employ tax enforcement as an instrument to counter the 
negative impact that  terrorist activity has on tax bases, tax revenues and, in short, on the 
economy as a whole. This result suggests that previous estimations of the impact of terrorism 
on the Basque economy are implicitly calculated net of the impact of terrorism on tax 
administration and, thus, they could be considered as lower bound approximations of the 
actual net effect of this shock on the Basque economic outcomes. 
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1. Introduction 
Terrorism can impact aggregate economic outputs (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003) as well as specific sectors of 
activity (for a survey, see, e.g., Llussá and Tavares, 2007a and 2007b), representing more generally a cost for the 
economy of the affected countries (see, e.g., Enders and Olson, 2012). Besides personal and material damages, 
terrorist activity induces a change in the risk perception of economic agents, leading to a permanent reduction in 
productive investments and consumption of goods (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008; Eckstein and Tsiddon, 2004). 
Additionally, the terrorists’ predatory financing system may also impact the economy and its agents. In this 
regard, one of the main forms of funding used by terrorist groups is that of extortion – the so-called 
“revolutionary tax” paid by entrepreneurs and liberal professionals1. As a result of its impact on economic activity 
and on the behaviour of economic agents, terrorism may also influence the design of fiscal and monetary policies, 
either as any other unpredictable shock would or as part of the policy makers’ endogenous reaction to terrorist 
activity. As the previous literature suggests (see Gupta et al., 2004), terrorism can affect the fiscal accounts 
through three main potential channels: by disrupting real economic activity (GDP); by distorting the composition 
of government spending; and by affecting the tax bases with negative consequences for tax revenues. While the 
evidence confirms the negative effect of terrorism on GDP growth and demonstrates an increase in public 
spending to cover additional security needs (see, e.g., Hobjin, 2002 and Gupta et al., 2004) with its negative 
impact on the budget deficit (see, e.g., Eichenbaum and Fisher, 2004; Wildasin, 2002), very little has been said 
about the potential effects of terrorist activity on tax bases, tax collection and tax revenues. 
 
The present paper contributes to this literature by analysing the presence of externalities in tax collection due to 
terrorism. Specifically, I use the Basque Country2 as a case study for testing the impact of terrorism on tax 
enforcement policies. Terrorism can distort the behaviour of the economic agents residing and operating there by 
inducing them to reduce their investment and consumption or to move their residence in order to avoid the costs 
                                                     
1 This is the practice of several nationalist and separatist terrorist organizations including “Euskadi Ta Askatasuna” (Basque 
Homeland and Freedom) – ETA in the Basque Country (Buesa and Baumert, 2013); the Provisional Irish Republican Army – 
IRA (Silke, 1998), and the National Liberation Front of Corsica – FCLN (Sanchez, 2008). 
 
2 Here I refer to the Basque Country in a wider sense to include Spain’s so-called foral autonomous communities of the 
Basque Country and Navarre. The foral community of the Basque Country comprises three provinces (Alava, Guipuzcoa and 
Vizcaya) while the foral community of Navarre coincides with the homonym province. These provinces have a high level of 
tax autonomy while the remaining Spanish provinces are mainly administered by a central tax agency. See Appendix 1 for a 
detailed description of the ETA-Basque framework.  
2
of terrorism3. Graph 1 shows the presence of a negative correlation between aggregate investment in the Basque 
Country and Navarre and the level of activity of the terrorist organization ETA in terms of killings per year. This 
provides casual evidence of the negative impact of terrorism on the economic activity in these regions.  
 
[GRAPH 1] 
 
Given the costs of terrorism, the regional tax authorities might have an incentive to counteract these costs by 
alleviating tax pressure so as not to lose their tax bases. Due to the pressures of terrorist extortion and the direct 
damage to their businesses caused by terrorist attacks, entrepreneurs and liberal professionals constitute a cluster 
within the population that is especially exposed to these costs. Tax enforcement policy is a flexible, adaptable 
instrument for selective intervention, which can be used to compensate this specific cluster of the population for 
the costs incurred4. In this regard, there is casual evidence that at least one Basque tax authority has reacted to 
ETA’s extortions by tolerating its fiscal deductibility as a cost and by exempting the tax returns of the affected 
entrepreneurs from fiscal inspections. An investigation conducted in 2004 by the Spanish anticorruption 
prosecution agency, reported by Buesa (2011) and by the national press5, reported that the tax authority of the 
Basque province of Vizcaya formally exempted from being audited the tax returns of a group of entrepreneurs 
and liberal professionals that had treated payments to the terrorist organization as deductions in their tax forms. 
The consequent fiscal opacity might further distort the taxpayers’ incentives to resist extortion, particularly “if the 
payments to terrorists are mentally accounted for as an additional tax and, furthermore, if you are confident of 
obtaining a tax deduction from the tax authorities” (Barbería, 2004). 
 
The objective of this paper, therefore, is to determine whether tax enforcement can be employed as an instrument 
                                                     
3 According to Buesa (2011) the so-called “Basque Democratic Diaspora” began in the mid-seventies and involved mainly 
businessmen and the self-employed, which make up the group most badly affected by the costs of terrorism in the form of 
extortion, but from the mid-nineties onwards the phenomenon began to affect the rest of the population. 
 
4 Enforcement policies are important determinants of the level and distribution of effective tax rates (see e.g. Johns and 
Slemrod, 2010) and, hence, they influence the total amount of tax revenues collected by governments. Previous literature on 
tax externalities has demonstrated the possibility of horizontal tax externalities in tax enforcement (see Cremer & Gahvari, 
2000; Durán-Cabré et al., 2014). 
 
5 See e.g. Korta J.M., “Las Haciendas vascas crean un fichero especial para los chantajeados por ETA” [“The Basque tax 
authorities create a special file for those blackmailed by ETA”] in El Mundo (22nd January, 2004) and Bornstein, F. “¿Deduce 
el impuesto revolucionario?” [“Do you deduct the revolutionary tax?”], in Nueva Economia – El Mundo  (8th February, 
2004). 
3
for compensating the negative effect of terrorism on tax bases. To do so, I develop a theoretical model and 
empirically test it using a dataset based on survey results and other sources. The results of the theoretical analysis 
confirm the presence of externalities in tax enforcement due to the threat of the mobility of tax bases attributed to 
terrorism. I derive the reaction function of tax enforcement to the costs of terrorism and obtain a negative sign. As 
explained in detail in section 4.1, in order to corroborate this result I use Spanish data based on surveys, in which 
respondents are asked to express their opinion about the authorities’ tax enforcement effort and I employ 
alternative measures of the costs produced by ETA’s terrorist activity. By estimating ordered response models, I 
find a significant and negative impact of terrorism on tax enforcement as perceived by individuals who reside in 
the Basque Country and Navarre. In particular, this impact is found to be stronger for entrepreneurs and liberal 
professionals, while no significant impact is found for individuals resident in the rest of Spain. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of the relevant literature, section 3 
presents the theoretical framework, section 4 presents the empirical strategy while section 5 presents the results. 
Finally, I conclude in section 6 with some remarks. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The literature on the economics of terrorism is vast and can be usefully classified in different areas of study, 
including the analysis of the impact of terrorism on aggregate economic output and on specific sectors of activity 
as well as the effect of terrorism on economic policies. In particular, an increasing number of papers focuses on 
the economic output consequences of terrorist activity (see, e.g., Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Eckstein and 
Tsiddon, 2004; Eldor and Melnick, 2004). The main conclusion of these articles is that terrorism represents a cost 
for the economies affected and that terrorist activities do reduce economic growth, particularly if they are 
concentrated in specific regions (see, e.g., Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; World Bank, 2002, 2003). That 
terrorism represents an economic cost is confirmed by the literature analysing the effect of terrorism on specific 
economic sectors. In this regard, several articles show that terrorist attacks may be considered as idiosyncratic 
shocks associated with noticeable decreases in consumption and investment (see, e.g., Eckstein and Tsiddon, 
2004; Blomberg et al., 2004), as well as in capital flows and trade across borders (see, e.g., Abadie and 
Gardeazabal, 2008; Nitsch and Schumacher, 2004), tourism (see, e.g., Enders and Sandler, 1991, 1996; Buckley 
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and Klemm, 1993) and airline demand (see, e.g., Ito and Lee, 2004). 
 
Yet, the possibility that terrorist activity might have fiscal and monetary consequences has received only limited 
attention in the literature, although, as Wildasin (2002) notes, terrorist “attacks are likely to trigger a complex 
series of simultaneous adjustments that reverberate throughout the entire system of private and public decision-
making”6. In a similar vein is the study undertaken by Gupta et al. (2004) that analyses the fiscal effects of armed 
conflicts and terrorism on 20 low- and middle-income countries. These authors empirically corroborate that 
terrorism negatively affects GDP growth and changes the composition of government spending by increasing 
military expenditure in response to additional security needs, accompanied by a negative effect on social public 
expenditure (health and education) and on the level of the public deficit. On the revenue side, they show that the 
fiscal accounts are affected only in terms of a reduction in real economic activity, but they do not show any 
significant effect of terrorism on the government revenue-to-GDP ratio.  
 
Further contributions to this literature are made by various papers that deal with the fiscal and economic policy 
consequences of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Hobjin (2002) estimates that the economic impact of 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks in terms of U.S. security policies are relatively small (0.35 % of GDP in 2003) and they 
are unlikely to have major effects on the fiscal discipline of the government or on productivity in the private 
sector. Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) and Wildasin (2002) argue that the large increase in military expenditures 
in the aftermath of 9/11 is not sufficient to justify the rise in the government deficit and the large fall in labour 
and capital tax rates. Thus, these papers suggest that isolated terrorist events, such as the 9/11 attacks, have a 
significant but limited effect on fiscal policies.  
 
Further research is needed in this field and, seen from this perspective, the analysis of the impact of terrorism on 
fiscal policies in the Basque Country is particularly appropriate. Since this particular case is characterized by 
persistent terrorist violence over a long period of time, the potential impact of terrorism on fiscal policies might 
extend beyond the simple spending reaction to an unexpected but isolated economic shock. As a consequence, I 
expect to find a clear endogenous response on the part of the tax authorities in terms of their tax collection policy. 
                                                     
6 Wildasin, 2002, p.3. Italics are mine. 
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 Given the case under study here, it is useful to refer to the literature that analyzes the economic impact of 
terrorism in the Basque Country from a range of different perspectives. On the output side, the economic 
consequences of ETA terrorism have been accurately analysed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). On the one 
hand, the authors estimate the macroeconomic impact of terrorism in the Basque Country using a synthetic 
Spanish region with the characteristics of the Basque Country but in the absence of terrorism. Based on this 
comparison, the authors find a 10-percent average gap between Basque per capita GDP and the per capita GDP of 
a comparable synthetic region without terrorism. On the other hand, the authors use ETA’s 1998-1999 truce as a 
natural experiment to estimate the impact of terrorism on the stock markets and find that the stocks of firms with 
a significant share of their business activity in the Basque Country showed a positive relative performance during 
the truce period, and a relative negative performance when the truce ended. Abadie and Gardeazabal’s (2003) 
results suggest that terrorism may have further externality effects on tax bases and, consequently, on Basque 
fiscal policies. This paper aims at filling this gap in the literature. 
 
Buesa and Baumert (2013) describe ETA’s financing system and its complex structural and economic network, 
but also illustrate the direct/indirect economic costs that ETA’s terrorist activity has on the Basque economy. 
Again, their study clearly indicates that when terrorism is persistent in the Basque Country and Navarre the 
negative economic impact is substantial. 
 
Finally, note this paper shares some of the features of the literature on the economic-policy impact of mafia-type 
organized crime (see in particular Alexeev et al., 2003; 2004). The theoretical framework presented in these 
papers is particularly appropriate for describing the context analysed here because of the similarities between 
mafia-type organizations and the terrorist organization ETA, particularly with regard to the extorting of regular 
payments from businessmen and firms, but more generally in that they represent a constant threat to the economic 
stability of the affected regions. This literature has emphasised the role of the mafia as an alternative tax collector 
and provider of public goods, such as protection and other services that facilitate a firm’s underground activities, 
thus demonstrating the existence of externalities between the government and the mafia in the tax collection 
6
process7. 
  
In section 3, I introduce elements from the models developed in this literature into my framework based on 
Durán-Cabré et al., 2014.  
 
3. The Theoretical Framework 
Here I seek to identify the possible externality in tax administration due to terrorist activity. I develop a simple 
framework consisting of a federal state comprising two regions (𝑖 = 1,2) of equal size in which the total 
population is normalized to one. Region 1 is subject to the permanent threat of terrorist activity, while the other 
one is not. I consider two players: the regional tax authorities and the terrorist organization. Adhering to the most 
common approach in the literature (see, e.g., Shaw et al., 2009; Slemrod & Yitzhaki, 2002, 1987), I design the tax 
administrations as revenue maximizing agencies that set the tax enforcement rate 𝛽𝑖 ∈ (0, 1) in their regions. 
Here I focus on the potential externality effect of terrorism on tax enforcement policies, and so I restrict my 
attention to one tax instrument, 𝛽𝑖, while assuming the tax rates in the two regions to be exogenously set. In line 
with the literature on extortion by mafia-type criminal organizations (see, e.g., Alexeev et al., 2003; 2004), I 
design the terrorist organization as a competing, revenue-maximizing tax collector that finances its violent 
activity in region 1 through the extortion of regular payments from its population. Individuals face an income tax 
on an exogenously fixed and normalized-to-one tax base and decide the share 𝛼 ∈ (0, 1) of income to declare 
maximizing their utility. To ensure an interior solution, tax evasion is assumed to be costly for the individual. 
Since the effectiveness of a tax enforcement policy largely depends on the way it is perceived by taxpayers8, I 
assume the enforcement rate to enter into the individual’s objective function through his perceived probability of 
                                                     
7 In particular, Alexeev et al. (2004) argue that the presence of the mafia can actually benefit the revenue-maximizing 
government as long as public goods do not play a significant role in determining whether the firms operate above or 
underground. Although this literature has generally assumed that the mafia can tax only underground activities, Alexeev et al. 
(2003) suppose that if the official government is sufficiently weak the mafia can and does tax above ground activities too. 
These authors show that when the demand for the firms’ output is inelastic and the mafia is not too strong, the revenue-
raising capacity of the state is not affected by the mafia, while when the demand is elastic the government’s revenues decline 
as the mafia grows stronger. 
 
8 In this sense there is vast evidence from psychology that individuals tend to overestimate the probability of their being 
audited even when fully informed about actual policy (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This “may therefore provide an 
additional explanation for tax compliance. If taxpayers give more weight to the probability of an audit than they ought to (at 
least relative to an expected utility model), then compliance will be greater than the level predicted by the standard 
economics approach.” (Alm, 2000, p. 748). 
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being audited 𝛽𝑖
𝑒(𝛽𝑖 , 𝑋 )
9. For sake of simplicity, the individual’s problem is not explicitly developed here, and I 
assume the results of the standard literature (see Allingham & Sandmo 1972; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Alm, 
2000). Then, the model consists of three stages. At the first stage, the terrorist organization sets 𝐸 ∈ (0,1), the 
amount of the extortion10. At stage 2 the regional tax authorities set the regional tax enforcement rate 𝛽𝑖 and at the 
third stage individuals choose their region of residence. The solution is provided by backward induction, but I will 
not solve stage 1, as the focus of our empirical analysis is stage 2. 
 
This model has elements of both vertical and horizontal tax competition. Vertically, the tax authority in region 1 
and the terrorist organization compete because they co-occupy the same normalized-to-one tax base. There is also 
horizontal competition because the tax authorities in the two regions compete in a race to the bottom in tax 
enforcement rates in order not to lose the mobile tax bases. Moreover, and unlike the previous literature (see 
Cremer & Gahvari, 2000; Durán-Cabré et al., 2014), horizontal competition is not fair in this model because of 
the presence of the externality produced by the terrorist organization in region 1 that reduces the tax authorities’ 
ability to set 𝛽1. 
 
I employ the notion of “home attachment” (see Mansoorian & Myers, 1993 and 1997) to model the problem at 
stage 3. At this stage, individuals compare their indirect utility function in the two regions in order to decide 
where they wish to reside. Assuming that 𝑛 ∈ (0, 1) indexes the individuals by measuring the non-pecuniary 
(psychic) benefit they derive from living in region 2 and that individuals are uniformly distributed between 0 and 
111 I can describe the preferences of individuals 𝑛 with respect to location in this way: 
                                                     
9 Where   
𝜕𝛽𝑖
𝑒
𝜕𝛽𝑖
> 0, 
𝜕2𝛽𝑖
𝑒
𝜕𝛽𝑖
2 > 0 and 𝑋 is a variable exogenously collecting information about the individual and situational 
characteristics as well as the social context that might have an impact on the individual’s perceived enforcement (see e.g. 
Alm, 2000). Following Kahneman and Tversky (1979) I assume 𝛽𝑖
𝑒(𝛽𝑖 , 𝑋 ) ≥ 𝛽𝑖. 
 
10 Since the tax bases are normalized to one, it is possible to alternatively interpret 𝐸 as an extortion rate or as a lump-sum 
payment and even more generally as a linear cost. The model takes into consideration just one component of the total cost of 
terrorism but its broad interpretation allows us to easily generalize its effects on tax administration. Indeed I am assuming 
that the entire population in region 1 is the victim of extortion by the terrorist organization. This is compatible with assuming 
that terrorism is a cost borne by all the regional population, which seems to be a reasonable assumption. A possible extension 
to the model would be to consider that the terrorist organization also decides the share of population in region 1 to be 
extorted 𝛾 ∈ (0,1) in addition to 𝐸. This would lead to the same result since the only change would be the way in which the 
total amount of extortion is collected through variables 𝐸 and 𝛾. 
 
11 Thus individuals indexed by 𝑛 ∈ (0,
1
2
) reside in region 1 while those identified by 𝑛 ∈ (
1
2
, 1) reside in region 2. 
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 𝑉(𝑛) = {
𝑈1
∗ + 𝑎 × (1 − 𝑛) − 𝐸       if 𝑛 lives in region 1
𝑈2
∗ + 𝑎 × 𝑛                           if 𝑛 lives in region 2
                                                                                               (1) 
 
where 𝑈𝑖
∗ = 𝑈𝑖
∗(1 − 𝛼∗(𝛽𝑖;  𝑡𝑖)) represents the (pecuniary) indirect utility function of an individual residing in 
region i = 1, 212, 𝑡𝑖  is the tax rate exogenously fixed in region i, and 𝑎 ∈ (0,+ ∞) is a parameter representing the 
cost sustained by an individual when moving away from their home region. In equilibrium, the marginal 
individual, that is, the one indifferent to residing in either region 1 or 2 is identified by 𝑛 = 𝑛1 such that: 
 
𝑈1
∗ + 𝑎 × (1 − 𝑛1) − 𝐸 = 𝑈2
∗ + 𝑎 × 𝑛1.                                                                                                                             (2) 
 
Since ∫ 𝑑𝑛 = 𝑛1
𝑛1
0
,  𝑛1 also represents the population resident in region 1 in equilibrium: 
 
𝑛1 = 𝑛1(𝛽1, 𝐸; 𝑎, 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝛽2) =
1
2
+
𝑈1
∗ − 𝑈2
∗ − 𝐸
2𝑎
.                                                                                                          (3) 
 
The population in region 2 in the migration equilibrium is:  
 
𝑛2 = ∫ 𝑑𝑛 =
1
𝑛1
1 − 𝑛1                                                                                                                                                                (4) 
 
At stage 2, the regional tax authorities simultaneously set the tax enforcement rate by anticipating the optimal 
level of 𝐸 set by the terrorist organization and by maximizing their objective function. The problem of tax 
authority in region 1 is then: 
 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝛽1
 𝑅1(𝛽1, 𝐸 ; 𝑎, 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝛽2) = 𝑛1 × 𝑟1 = (
1
2
+
[𝜃2−𝜃1+𝑔2−𝑔1]−𝐸
2𝑎
) × [𝜃1 − 𝑑(𝛽1)], 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
12 The direct utility function is defined as 𝑈 = [1 − 𝑡𝑖 × [𝛼 + (1 − 𝛼) × 𝜏 × 𝛽𝑖
𝑒(𝛽𝑖 , 𝑋 )] − 𝑔(1 − 𝛼)] where (𝜏 − 1) > 0 is   
the exogenous tax penalty per unit of tax evaded such that 𝜏 × 𝛽𝑖
𝑒(𝛽𝑖 , 𝑋 ) < 1 and the function 𝑔(1 − 𝛼) represents the cost 
of tax evasion (1 − 𝛼), such that  𝑔′(1 − 𝛼) > 0, 𝑔′′(1 − 𝛼) > 0, 𝑔(0) = 0, 𝑔(1) → +∞.  
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 where 𝜃1 ≡ 𝑡1 × [𝛼 + (1 − 𝛼) × 𝜏 × 𝛽1] is defined as the effective tax rate in region 1
13, 𝑑(𝛽1) represents the tax 
administration cost such that 𝑑′(𝛽1) > 0, 𝑑(𝛽1)
′′ > 0 and  𝑟1 ≡
𝑅1
𝑛1
= [𝐵 × 𝜃1 − 𝑑(𝛽1) ] is the unitary tax 
revenue. Tax authority in region 2 faces the symmetric problem. The FOCs of these problems are then: 
 
𝜕𝑟1
𝜕𝛽1
= −
2𝑎
𝑈1
∗ − 𝑈2
∗ − 𝐸 + 𝑎
× 𝑛1′𝛽1 × 𝑟1 > 0                                                                                                                    (5) 
 
and 
𝜕𝑟2
𝜕𝛽2
=
2𝑎
𝑈2
∗ − 𝑈1
∗ + 𝐸 + 𝑎
× 𝑛1′𝛽2 × 𝑟2 > 0                                                                                                                        (6) 
 
The left hand side of both Eq. 5 and Eq. 6 represents, for each region, the marginal benefit of increasing 𝛽𝑖, while 
the right hand side represents the corresponding marginal cost. In particular, since 𝑛1′𝛽1 < 0 and 𝑛1′𝛽2 > 0, the 
marginal cost is positive in both cases. If we examine the denominator on the right hand side of both equations, it 
can be seen that the presence of costs related to terrorism (E), by affecting 𝑛1 and 𝑛2, increases the marginal cost 
of tax enforcement in region one while relaxing it in region 2. Consequently, the optimal level of 𝛽1 (𝛽2) turns out 
to be lower (higher) than in the absence of terrorism. In other words, at this stage, given the exogenous level of 
𝑎, 𝑡1 and 𝑡2, the tax administration of region 1 has to compensate for the costs of terrorism by relaxing its 
enforcement of existing tax legislation. 
 
Multiple equilibria are possible and for sake of simplicity I assume that 𝑡1 = 𝑡2 = 𝑡. It is possible to show that in 
equilibrium 𝛽1 < 𝛽2 then, depending on the capacity of the tax authority in region 1 to maintain the individuals 
indifferent to living in either region 1 or 2, and given the optimal level of 𝐸 it is possible to describe the 
equilibrium in this way: 
 
                                                     
13 The effective tax rate is defined between 0 and 1; I limit the attention to the case where 𝑡1 + 𝐸 ≤ 1 since the case 𝑡1 + 𝐸 >
1 clearly cannot represent a sub-game perfect equilibrium. 
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 𝑛1 <
1
2
<  𝑛2                          if  𝑈1
∗ < 𝑈2
∗ + 𝐸
 𝑛1 =  𝑛1 =
1
2
                          if  𝑈1
∗ = 𝑈2
∗ + 𝐸
.                                                                                                                    (7) 
 
Applying the inverse function theorem to Eq. (5), I derive the reaction function of  𝛽1 with respect to 𝐸 in order to 
determine the nature of the externalities in tax administration due to the cost of terrorism: 
 
𝜕𝛽1
𝜕𝐸
=   −
𝑛1𝐸 × 𝑟1𝛽1
𝑅1𝛽1𝛽1
(𝛽1, 𝐸; 𝑎, 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝛽2)
=  −
−
1
2𝑎 × 𝑟1𝛽1
𝑅1𝛽1𝛽1
(𝛽1, 𝐸; 𝑎, 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝛽2)
< 0                                                           (8) 
 
The first term of the numerator is the marginal loss of population in region 1 due to the costs of terrorism and it is 
negative; the term 𝑟1𝛽1is the marginal unitary tax revenue that is positive under the FOC. According to the second 
order condition of the administration’s problem, the denominator of Eq. 8 is negative. The slope of the reaction 
function is then negative. Thus, Eq. 8 shows that the activity of extortion practiced by the terrorist organization 
causes a negative externality on tax enforcement set by the regional administration representing its strategic 
substitute. 
 
The individual perceived enforcement 𝛽𝑖
𝑒(𝛽𝑖 , 𝑋 ) positively depends on the actual tax enforcement rate and, 
consequently, it follows that the costs of terrorism also reduce the individual’s perceived level of enforcement: 
𝜕𝛽1
𝑒
𝜕𝐸
=   −
𝑛1𝐸 × 𝑟1𝛽1
𝑅1𝛽1𝛽1
(𝛽1, 𝐸; 𝑎, 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝛽2)
×
𝜕𝛽1
𝑒
𝜕𝛽1
= −
−
1
2𝑎 × 𝑟1𝛽1
𝑅1𝛽1𝛽1
(𝛽1, 𝐸; 𝑎, 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝛽2)
×
𝜕𝛽1
𝑒
𝜕𝛽1
< 0                                     (9) 
 
I empirically test this result in the next section. 
 
4. The Empirical Analysis 
In this section, I present the empirical framework used in order to test my main hypothesis, provide a description 
of the dataset and finally comment on the results of the analysis. 
4.1 The empirical framework 
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The theoretical model developed in the previous section advances an interesting result that requires empirical 
investigation. Terrorism operates as a negative externality on tax administration by constraining the tax 
authority’s ability to enforce existing tax legislation: because of individual mobility, the tax authority reacts to the 
higher costs of terrorism being borne by taxpayers by reducing the level of tax enforcement so as not to lose tax 
bases (Eq. 8). By impacting the actual policy, the costs of terrorism also have effects on tax enforcement as it is 
perceived by individuals, being lower in the presence of costs related to terrorism (Eq. 9). Here I test this 
hypothesis by means of econometric techniques. In order to perform my analysis, I construct a dataset based on 
the information provided by surveys and data from different Spanish sources.  
 
Specifically, I use data from the 1994-2013 waves of the survey “Public opinion and fiscal policy”14, conducted 
annually and released by the Spanish Centre of Sociological Research (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas in 
Spanish, CIS henceforth). This repeated cross-section survey reports information on subjective perceptions of the 
fiscal policies, public provided goods and services, and other aspects of the tax system in Spain. Socio-economic 
information about the respondents and their province of residence is also included in the survey data. In order to 
define my endogenous variable I employ the following question: “Do you think that the tax administration is 
currently taking many/quite a few/a few/very few steps in its efforts to fight tax evasion?”15, which remains 
unchanged over the 1994-2013 period. For any respondent i in province j in survey year t, I code the answer to 
this question into the variable 𝛽𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 which is scaled from very low (1) to very high (4) according to the answer. 
Thus, by defining 𝛽𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 as an ordinal dependent variable measuring the latent perceived tax enforcement of 
individuals (𝛽𝑒∗𝑖𝑗𝑡), I can design an ordered response model (see e.g. Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 504-509) to test the 
hypothesis raised in Eq. 9 in this way16: 
                                                     
14 All annually released surveys are based on personal interviews conducted with a representative sample of 2500 Spaniards 
over the age of 18. The complete contents of the survey are available at the CIS website (http://www.cis.es). 
 
15 The original question in Spanish is “¿Cree Ud. que, en la actualidad. la Administración hace muchos, bastantes, pocos o 
muy pocos esfuerzos para luchar contra el fraude fiscal?” (see e.g. question n. 21 of the survey n. 2994 released in 2013). 
 
16 In this case, since the dependent variable is defined as an ordinal discrete ranking, the most appropriate estimation strategy 
is that of employing an ordered response model. Indeed as Greene (2002) states “although the outcome is discrete, the 
multinomial logit or probit model would fail to account for the ordinal nature of the dependent variable. Ordinary regression 
analysis would err in the opposite direction, however. Take the outcome of an opinion survey. If the responses are coded 0, 1, 
12
 𝛽𝑒∗𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜇𝑇 + 𝜋𝑇 × 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜌𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡  + 𝒀𝒊𝒋𝒕𝝍+ 𝑿𝒊𝒕𝜶 + 𝜗𝑗 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                              
𝛽𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 =
{
 
 
 
 
1            if    𝛽𝑒∗𝑖𝑗𝑡 ≤ 𝜔1                             
2            if   𝜔1 ≤ 𝛽
𝑒∗
𝑖𝑗𝑡 ≤ 𝜔2                   
3            if   𝜔2 ≤ 𝛽
𝑒∗
𝑖𝑗𝑡 ≤ 𝜔3                  
4            if    𝛽𝑒∗𝑖𝑗𝑡 ≥ 𝜔3                             
                                                                                                  (10) 
 
I estimate the coefficients as well as the cut-points in Eq. 10 through an ordered probit model by means of 
maximum likelihood technique. The variable 𝑇 measures the costs generated by ETA’s terrorist activity. In order 
to identify this, I employ five alternative proxies17. The first approach is standard in the literature (see, e.g., 
Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003), and is based on the use of information about ETA’s truces and ceasefires: I 
construct a dummy variable equal to one for the years in which a truce was announced by ETA18. This variable 
indirectly measures the costs of ETA’s activity, while the other variables employed directly measure the costs of 
terrorism. Specifically, I employ two measures of the aggregate costs attributable to ETA’s activity. They refer to 
the pecuniary compensation for the damage caused by terrorism and provided respectively by the Spanish 
Ministry of the Interior19 and by the Insurance Compensation Consortium (“Consorcio de Compensacion de 
Seguros” in Spanish, IC henceforth)20 on a national and annual basis21. Both variables are defined at the national 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
2, 3, or 4, then linear regression would treat the difference between a 4 and a 3 the same as that between a 3 and a 2, whereas 
in fact they are only a ranking.” (see Greene, 2002, p. 736). 
 
17 Depending on the measure employed, 𝑇 varies over time or alternatively both over time and across provinces. For this 
reason I omit subscripts. 
 
18 Information on truces is extracted from the dataset of the Spanish Ministry of the Interior. Specifically I define 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑡 as 
being equal to one if a ceasefire was announced and implemented by ETA during the survey year t, i.e. during a period of 
time within the 12 months previous to the implementation of the survey. 
 
19 The Ministry’s compensations include personal as well as any kind of material damages. These data are extracted from the 
Spanish Ministry of the Interior’s annually released statistical report (for the report of 2013 see http://goo.gl/GEwg2R). 
 
20 The IC is a public corporate entity attached to the Spanish Ministry of the Economy. It is a guarantee fund that aims at 
providing insurance cover for a series of extraordinary risks such as terrorism and natural catastrophes. The data are extracted 
from the IC’s report “Extraordinary risk statistics 1971-2012” (http://goo.gl/5ND1n0). 
 
21 These data are aggregated at the national level and do not distinguish between the compensation paid out to the victims of 
ETA from that paid out to the victims of other terrorist organizations. Nevertheless, I was able to exclude data referring to the 
2004 Islamic terrorist attack on Madrid and as 96.5% of the fatalities of terrorism in Spain are attributable to ETA (in 
common with almost the totality of all other classes of injury due to terrorism), it seems that these measures provide a 
reasonable approximation of the damages caused by ETA’s activity. 
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level, as are the proxies of the ETA terrorist costs for the affected economy. Alternatively, I measure ETA’s level 
of activity by employing a variable collecting information on the number of fatalities attributed to ETA in any 
Spanish province and, thus, directly identify the costs generated by ETA in terms of the threat to personal security 
and provincial stability22. According to the theoretical model, terrorism should negatively impact tax enforcement 
and its perception in the areas most affected by terrorist activity in Spain, namely, the four provinces belonging to 
the foral autonomous communities of the Basque Country and Navarre. Thus, I employ an interaction term 
between the measure of terrorism costs and 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡, a dummy variable equal to one for residents in the foral 
provinces and I expect the linear combination between the interacted and the un-interacted terms to be negative23. 
 
As a final measure of the costs of terrorism, I employ an estimation of the total revenues obtained by ETA 
through the “revolutionary tax” in the foral communities of the Basque Country and Navarre. This variable is 
extracted from Buesa and Baumert (2013). These authors estimate the total amount of extortion required by ETA 
on an annual basis in the Basque Country and Navarre by employing documents seized from the terrorist group 
by Spain’s anticorruption prosecution agency; thus, this variable is incomplete and measured with error. This 
variable is set as being equal to zero for the rest of the country and, consequently, no interaction term is 
calculated. 
 
According to the assumption of the theoretical model, perceived tax enforcement is a function of the information 
on the actual enforcement policy that individuals have. In particular, I expect actual tax enforcement and the 
individuals’ perception of it to be positively related. In order to disentangle the changes in perceived tax 
enforcement due to the externality produced by terrorism in the setting of the actual tax enforcement from those 
changes determined by other factors that may alter the real tax enforcement, I include in vector 𝑿𝒋𝒕 information 
on political and budgetary variables that directly affect the setting of the enforcement policy. Specifically, I 
                                                     
22 This frequently used indicator has been criticized since it tends to underestimate the degree of terrorist activity (Frey et al., 
2007). Nevertheless, in this framework, the possibility of expressing this variable at a provincial level is of particular interest 
for the analysis since in the territories belonging to the foral regime the tax authorities are appointed to operate at this level of 
government. The variable is also defined considering the survey year and not the current one and the information on fatalities 
is also extracted from the Spanish Ministry of the Interior’s dataset. 
 
23 Since the variable 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑡 is indirectly related to the level of terrorist activity, its coefficient is expected to be positive and 
significant. 
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include dummies for elections and rightist governments. I also control for provincial per-capita GDP and 
population.  
 
In the theoretical model, I have also assumed perceived tax enforcement to be a function of individual personal 
characteristics and the social context. For this reason, I control in Eq. 10 for the vector of variables 𝒀𝒊𝒋𝒕 collecting 
information on relevant personal and social characteristics that are likely to influence the individual’s perception 
of the risk of being audited. These variables are also extracted from the survey “Public opinion and fiscal policy”. 
Specifically I control for sex, age, level of education, civil status, job market status, the industry in which 
respondents work, their political views (including dummies for leftist voter and nationalist voter) and I include a 
dummy equal to one for individuals that are heads of household and a dummy equal to one if the respondent to 
the survey declares themselves as being an entrepreneur or liberal professional.  Finally, I include provincial fixed 
effects and time trends, while 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the error term.  
 
As emphasized in the introduction, Basque and Navarrese entrepreneurs and professionals constitute the cluster of 
individuals that are most affected by the costs of terrorism, as a result of their exposure to blackmailing. This 
makes these self-employed workers a specific target for potential tax enforcement cutbacks by the foral tax 
authorities. Therefore, I suspect that the costs of terrorism may impact the perceived tax enforcement of self-
employed workers resident in the Basque Country and Navarre more strongly. For this reason, I further interact 
the term 𝑇 × 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 with the dummy 𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡. Thus, I define in a similar fashion the following model: 
 
𝛽𝑒∗𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛾𝑇 + 𝜉𝑇 × 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 +𝑡 𝜂𝑇 × 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜑𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡+𝝀𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝒀
′
𝒊𝒋𝒕𝝈 + 𝑿
′
𝒊𝒕𝜶 + 𝜗
′
𝑗 + 𝜏
′
𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 
𝛽𝑒𝑗𝑖𝑡 =
{
 
 
 
 
1            if    𝛽𝑒∗𝑗𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑤1                             
2            if   𝑤1 ≤ 𝛽
𝑒∗
𝑗𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑤2                   
3            if   𝑤2 ≤ 𝛽
𝑒∗
𝑗𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑤3                  
4            if    𝛽𝑒∗𝑗𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝑤3                             
                                                                                                          (11) 
 
 
 
4.2 Data, sources and descriptive statistics 
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With the exception of the endogenous variable, the proxies of the costs of terrorism and of the individual personal 
characteristics discussed above, the other variables are obtained from the following statistical sources. The 
provincial per-capita GDP and the provincial population are provided by the Spanish National Institute of 
Statistics (INE). The dummies identifying rightist government in office and elections are based on information 
extracted from the electoral database of the Spanish Ministry of the Interior.  In Table 1, I report the summary 
statistics24. 
 
[TABLE 1] 
 
Before the multivariate analysis, I perform a test for the equality of the means of the subsample of the individuals 
residing in the foral provinces and the rest of the population concerning their perceived tax enforcement. The 
results of this analysis are reported in Table 2. 
 
[TABLE 2] 
 
According to this analysis (model 1), I can reject the hypothesis of equality of the means of the two subsamples, 
in particular the perceived tax enforcement mean in the foral regime subsample is significantly lower than that in 
the common regime subsample. In order to obtain a clearer picture of the distribution of the perceived tax 
enforcement in the two subsamples, I construct four dummy variables equal to one corresponding to the four 
values assumed by 𝛽𝑒𝑗𝑖𝑡 and I replicate the analysis of subsample means for these variables (models 2 to 5). The 
results go in the same direction, suggesting that the distribution of the perceived tax enforcement in the foral 
regime is more skewed to the right with respect to the corresponding distribution in the common regime 
subsample. This may depend in part on differences in the risk perception of the population in the two Spanish 
areas, but it may also be the result of substantial differences in the policy strategies set by the competent tax 
authorities in the two territories. In particular part of the potential differences in the policy strategies might be due 
to the externality that terrorism has on tax enforcement in the foral territories. To gain an initial insight into this 
issue I replicate the analysis performed in model 1 for the two sub-periods identified by the dummy Truce 
                                                     
24 I do not present descriptive statistics for the branch of industry in which respondents work in the interest of space as they 
are a large number of dummies. These descriptive statistics are available upon request. 
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(models 6 and 7). According to this analysis, the difference in means is mainly driven by the effects of terrorism 
but there is a residual part that is still explained by other potential factors. In the next section I report the results of 
the main analysis presented in section 4.1.  
 
5. Results 
In Table 3, I report the results of the estimation of alternative models expressed in Eq. 1025. As discussed above, I 
employ five alternative measures of the costs of terrorism that are reflected respectively in models 1 to 5. Using 
the interpretation I have given to the latent variable, it is possible to interpret the estimated coefficients in terms of 
the marginal effects of the regressors on the latent perceived tax enforcement 𝛽𝑒∗𝑗𝑖𝑡
26. In most of the models, the 
costs of terrorism significantly impact the individuals’ perceived tax enforcement in a way that is consistent with 
the theory. In particular, it has a significant negative impact on the perceived tax enforcement of individuals 
residing in the foral provinces – the interacted terms 𝑇 × 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 and the corresponding linear combination with 
𝑇 are significant in most of the specifications and present the expected signs – but it does not have any effect on 
the tax enforcement perceived by the rest of the individuals interviewed (the un-interacted terms 𝑇 are not 
significantly different from zero). Thus, this result suggests that while terrorism represents an externality in the 
tax-enforcement-setting process for the foral tax authorities, it does not impact at all on the setting of auditing 
policies in the provinces belonging to the common tax regime, which are administered by a central agency. 
Furthermore, I find that the dummy variable 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 is negative and significant confirming what the analysis of 
sub-samples means previously indicated. This result may well be evidence of the competitive behaviour of the 
foral provinces but it might also, in part, collect the residual effect of terrorism on tax enforcement that is not 
fully identified by the measures of terrorism employed. 
 
[TABLE 3] 
 
                                                     
25 The complete results for the covariates have been omitted for reasons of space but are available upon request. 
 
26 The coefficients can always be interpreted as the marginal effects of the regressors on the latent variable, which is 
particularly useful in contexts such as the one analyzed here, where the latent variable can be given some easily interpretable 
meaning and it is not a mere modeling device (see e.g. Wooldridge 2002). 
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In Table 4, I present the results of the estimation of alternative specifications of Eq. 11. The impact of ETA’s 
terrorist activity on the perceived tax enforcement of the residents in the foral provinces is even stronger for the 
cluster of entrepreneurs and liberal professionals, as the interacted terms and linear combinations of interacted 
and un-interacted coefficients show. The entrepreneurs and liberal professionals are found to report a higher 
perceived tax enforcement than that reported by the rest of the population27, which makes sense because their 
probability of being audited is higher as they have more opportunities to evade taxes.  
 
Thus, the results of the analysis performed here show that in the presence of more intense terrorist activity, 
individuals residing in the foral territories perceive a lower level of tax enforcement. This confirms that the costs 
of terrorism do represent a negative externality for the foral communities. In particular, the impact of the cost of 
terrorism is, most of the time, significantly stronger for self-employed people confirming that the foral tax 
authorities might react to the externalities attributable to terrorism by reducing tax enforcement in particular for 
this group of people. 
 
 [TABLE 4] 
 
As a robustness check, I perform an ordered logit estimation of the models presented above obtaining results 
congruent with the main analysis. The results are reported in Appendix 2. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, I have analysed the impact of externalities due to terrorism on fiscal policy, in particular, on tax 
enforcement. By altering individuals’ incentives to reside in their home region, terrorism constrains the tax 
authority’s ability to set tax enforcement policies in the affected region. As a result, the tax authority decreases 
the tax pressure by reducing the audit rate so as not to lose tax bases. This hypothesis has been tested for the 
Basque Country and Navarre: by employing a dataset based on surveys as well as on data extracted from other 
statistical sources, I estimated ordered response models whose outcomes corroborate the theory.  
 
                                                     
27 Even if not shown in Table 3, this result is present also in the absence of the interaction 𝑇 × 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡. 
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The costs of terrorism have been found to impact negatively and significantly the perceived tax enforcement of 
individuals residing in the provinces belonging to the Basque Country and Navarre, with a more marked effect on 
self-employed workers. This is the main contribution of the paper. No significant effect is reported for the 
residents in common-regime provinces, where the main taxes are administered by the central government. ETA’s 
terrorist activity acts then as a negative externality on the setting of tax enforcement policies only in the territories 
where terrorism represents a substantial and persistent cost that might significantly affect the residents’ incentives 
to move. We can conclude, therefore, that in the Basque Country and Navarre the tax administration uses tax 
enforcement as an instrument to counteract the negative effect of terrorism on its tax bases, tax revenues and 
definitely on the economy. Abadie and Gardeazabal’s (2003) results are implicitly calculated net of this effect, 
and so they could be considered as a lower bound of the impact of terrorism on the Basque economy.  
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Graph 1: Relationship between investmens and terrorist activity in the Basque Country and Navarre 
(1964-2012) 
      
Source: own calculations from IVIE and BBVA stock capital database (available at http://goo.gl/fbmGmG) and the Interior Ministry’s 
database on terrorism.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
  
Variable Measurement Unit Observatio
ns 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Key variables       
Perceived Enforcement Ranking 1 to 4 40913 2.37 0.81 1 4 
Truce Dummy 49656 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Killings_prov Units 49656 0.28 0.99 0 8 
Total_Extortion(BC) Millions of Euros 48513 0.14 0.85 0 10.42 
Int_Min_Compensation_Terr Millions of Euros 49656 4.37 30.07 0 12.92 
CCS_Compensation_Terr Millions of Euros 49656 10.97 10.32 0 40.08 
Individual Characteristics       
Female Dummy 49656 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Age Years 49625 46.03 18.14 18 99 
Schooly Years 49493 8.20 4.93 0 17 
Civil Status Dummy 
 
49656 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Household head Dummy 49656 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Worker Dummy 49656 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Self_Employed Dummy 49656 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Nationalist Dummy 49656 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Left Dummy 49656 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Social context characteristics       
Rigth Dummy 49656 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Per_Capita_GDP Thousands of Euros 49656 21823.88 26790.88 0.00 267471.90 
Population Thousands of People 49656 2054.46 2007.99 79.90 6461.97 
Foral  Dummy 49656 0.07 0.25 0 1 
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Table 2: Subsamples Means Estimation: Foral vs. Common regimes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Perceived Enforcement Dummy 
Perc_Enf=4 
Dummy 
Perc_Enf=3 
Dummy 
Perc_Enf=2 
Dummy 
Perc_Enf=1 
Perceived Enforcement 
Truce=0 
Perceived Enforcement 
Truce=1 
        
Common Regime (Foral = 0) 2.381*** 0.071*** 0.378*** 0.414*** 0.138*** 2.389*** 2.374*** 
 (575.718) (53.796) (152.132) (164.215) (78.100) (395.753) (418.210) 
Foral Regime (Foral = 1) 2.227*** 0.057*** 0.296*** 0.465*** 0.182*** 2.154*** 2.295*** 
 (144.690) (12.859) (34.071) (48.943) (24.803) (99.819) (105.525) 
        
Linear Combination  
(Foral_Regime – Common_Regime) 
-0.154*** -0.014** -0.081*** 0.051*** 0.045*** -0.235*** -0.079*** 
 (-9.65) (-3.04) (-9.00) (5.16) (5.89) (-10.48) (-3.51) 
        
Observations 40913 40913 40913 40913 40913 40913 40913 
Common regime 37615 37615 37615 37615 37615 37615 37615 
Foral regime 3298 3298 3298 3298 3298 3298 3298 
Equality of the means 
(H0: means of subsamples are equal) 
      
Wald F statistic 93.08 9.22 80.92 26.65 34.70 109.81 12.31 
p-value 0.0000 0.0024 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 
Note: t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 3: Impact of terrorism on perceived tax enforcement. 
Ordered Probit Models (1994-2013). Interaction Foral. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Perceived 
Enforcement 
Perceived 
Enforcement 
Perceived 
Enforcement 
Perceived 
Enforcement 
Perceived 
Enforcement 
      
Truce -0.010     
 (-0.522)     
Truce×Foral 0.196***     
 (4.180)     
Comp_Terr_IM  -0.002    
  (-0.551)    
Comp_Terr_IM×Foral   -0.018**    
  (-2.499)    
Comp_Terr_IC   0.001   
   (0.972)   
Comp_Terr_IC×Foral    -0.001   
   (-0.509)   
Annual_Killings_province    0.002  
    (0.286)  
Annual_Killings_province×Foral    -0.054***  
    (-3.951)  
Extortion (in Foral Provinces)     -0.009 
     (-0.941) 
Foral -0.352*** -0.158*** -0.313*** -0.182*** -0.266*** 
 (-8.913) (-2.799) (-8.694) (-3.448) (-5.003) 
Linear Combinations      
Truce +Truce×Foral 0.186***     
 (3.85)     
Comp_Terr_IM +Comp_Terr_IM×Foral  -0.019**    
  (-2.69)    
Comp_Terr_IC +Comp_Terr_IC×Foral 0.000   
   (0.07)   
Annual_Killings_province +Annual_Killings_province×Foral  -0.052***  
    (-4.37)  
Observations 40755 40755 40755 40755 39751 
Log likelihood -47128.840 -47127.195 -47142.276 -47065.466 -46281.486 
Wald chi2 (All variables) 5089.247 5126.426 3021.360 25984.423 3865.418 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Test for the equality of the cut-points (H0: w1=w2) 
Wald chi2 23269.54 23268.69 23366.97 23261.66 22618.57 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Test for the equality of the cut-points (H0: w2=w3) 
Wald chi2 18917.36 18910.21 19485.56 18924.38 18732.64 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each model includes Individual Characteristics, Contextual-level characteristics, 
Provincial fixed effects and Time Trends. In particular Individual Characteristics include sex, age, level of education , civil status, dummy variable for head 
of household, job market status, dummy for self-employed, branch of activity and political views (leftist voter and nationalist voter dummies). Contextual-
level characteristics include dummy for right government, per-capita GDP, population. 
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Table 4: Impact of terrorism on perceived tax enforcement. 
Ordered Probit Models (1994-2013). Interaction Foral & Self Employed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Perceived 
Enforcement 
Perceived 
Enforcement 
Perceived 
Enforcement 
Perceived 
Enforcement 
Perceived 
Enforcement 
Truce -0.011     
 (-0.549)     
Truce×Foral 0.169***     
 (3.463)     
Truce×Foral×SE 0.179*     
 (1.799)     
Comp_Terr_IM  -0.002    
  (-0.558)    
Comp_Terr_IM×Foral   -0.013*    
  (-1.783)    
Comp_Terr_IM×Foral×SE   -0.030***    
  (-2.613)    
Comp_Terr_IC   0.001   
   (1.055)   
Comp_Terr_IC×Foral    0.002   
   (0.804)   
Comp_Terr_IC×Foral×SE    -0.018***   
   (-4.618)   
Killings_province    0.002  
    (0.289)  
Killings_province×Foral    -0.052***  
    (-3.632)  
Killings_province×Foral×SE    -0.009  
    (-0.334)  
Extortion (in Foral)     -0.008 
     (-0.793) 
Extortion (in Foral)×SE     -0.046 
     (-1.506) 
Foral -0.158*** -0.152*** -0.310*** -0.183*** -0.264*** 
 (-2.804) (-2.689) (-8.607) (-3.449) (-4.981) 
SE 0.088*** 0.085*** 0.092*** 0.087*** 0.070** 
 (5.777) (5.633) (6.091) (5.794) (2.496) 
Linear Combinations      
Truce+Truce×Foral+Truce×Foral×SE 0.337***     
 (3.44)     
Comp_Terr_IM+Comp_Terr_IM×Foral+Comp_Terr_IM×Foral×SE -0.044***    
  (-3.64)    
Comp_Terr_IC+Comp_Terr_IC×Foral+Comp_Terr_IC×Foral×SE -0.015***   
   (-3.67)   
Killings_province + Killings_province×Foral +Killings_province×Foral×SE -0.059**  
  (-2.31)  
Extortion (in Foral)+ Extortion (in Foral)×SE   -0.054* 
     (-1.75) 
Observations 40755 40755 40755 40755 39751 
Log likelihood -47123.183 -47124.686 -47131.584 -47065.412 -46280.616 
Wald chi2 (All variables) 5015.030 5046.874 3042.743 25830.262 3846.938 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Test for the equality of the cut-points (H0: w1=w2) 
Wald chi2 23267.18 23271.72 23364.28 23261.94 22618.50 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Test for the equality of the cut-points (H0: w2=w3) 
Wald chi2 18917.59 18907.54 19484.87 18924.13 18731.97 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each model includes Individual Characteristics, Contextual-level characteristics, 
Provincial fixed effects and Time Trends. In particular Individual Characteristics include sex, age, level of education , civil status, dummy variable for head 
of household, job market status, dummy for self-employed, branch of activity and political views (leftist voter and nationalist voter dummies). Contextual-
level characteristics include dummy for right government, per-capita GDP, population. 
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Appendix 1: Framework background: The Basque Country and ETA  
The four provinces belonging to the Spanish autonomous communities of Navarre and the Basque Country 
represent the main part of the historical Basque territories: they share common cultural roots including a common 
second language, “Euskera”, which in those regions is co-official with Spanish. They are two of the richest 
regions in Spain, the Basque Country being the first and Navarra the third in terms of per capita GDP among the 
Spanish autonomous communities according to the data of the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE).  
From a tax management perspective, the Basque Country and Navarra enjoy a special (so-called “foral”) tax 
regime granting them an almost full autonomy in the setting and collecting of all the taxes which grants them  
complete jurisdiction in determining tax law and tax administration. The foral tax authorities are appointed at the 
provincial level and thus the four foral provinces levy all the taxes that elsewhere are levied by the central 
government (including personal income tax and corporate tax). In return both autonomous communities pay an 
annual quota for the common public services provided by the central government (such as defense), which is 
agreed between the two parties on a periodical basis. An important aspect of this system is that there is no 
effective mechanism of equalization between the foral communities and the common regime communities28. In 
Figure 1 I highlight the foral communities of Navarre and the Basque Country within the Spanish national 
confines. 
                                                     
28 For more information on the differences between the foral and the common regimes see e.g. Garcia-Milà and McGuire 
2007. 
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 Figure 1: The foral autonomous communities of Navarre and the Basque Country 
 
In this context in 1959 a group of Basque students founded the extreme left-wing terrorist organization ETA 
(Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, Basque acronym for “Basque Homeland and Freedom”) with the political objective of 
achieving the establishment of an independent Basque state29. ETA carried out its first terrorist attack in 1968 and 
since then its violent and paramilitary activity has claimed more than 800 lives and many more victims in Spain 
until the allegedly definitive cessation of its armed activity declared on 20 October 2011. In Figure 2, I report the 
distribution of killings due to ETA’s attacks by Spanish provinces. The picture shows that the majority of attacks 
were perpetrated in the Basque and Navarrese provinces but that also Madrid and Barcelona have been frequent 
targets. 
                                                     
29 Among others monographic works on ETA see e.g. Clark; 1984, Domínguez 1998 and Mees 2003. 
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 Figure 2: ETA’s killings by province 
 
In particular Basque entrepreneurs and liberal professionals were specific targets of violence including 
assassinations, robberies, extortion and kidnappings-for-ransom. In this regard Buesa and Baumert (2013) show 
that the revolutionary tax extorted from this cluster of the population was one of the main sources of income for 
ETA from the 1970s onwards, after substituting the previously more important activities of bank robberies and 
thefts. These authors estimated that during the three decades that range from 1978 to 2008, ETA obtained more 
than 115 million euros through its extortion activity. This value has to be considered a minimum, since the 
information employed is mostly obtained from documents seized from the terrorist group and, as such, is 
incomplete. In the same line, Juan Miguel Liñan Macias – former representative of the Spanish Ministry of 
Defense – declared that “ETA is funded mainly from one source: the money it collects through extortion of small 
and medium-sized businessmen, charging them the so-called "revolutionary tax". At present the amounts required 
are between 35,000 and 400,000 euros. The annual budget the terrorist organization needs for the maintenance of 
29
its structures is estimated at around 10 million euros.”30. Thus the effect of terrorism is responsible at least in part 
for the economic downturn suffered by the Basque Country during ETA’s period of activity (see Abadie and 
Gardaebazal, 2003; Enders and Sandler 1991, 1996). 
 
Finally ETA holds a central role within the Basque national liberation movement (MLNV), a composite 
aggregation of multiple organizations (both legal and illegal), which are united by the aforementioned common 
ideological objective but not always by any actual formal links. In the past decades, several judicial rulings have 
made illegal many, but not all, of the MLNV entities due to their connections with ETA. Some of the entities that 
are part of the MLNV are responsible for street terrorism, which represents a further threat to the stability of 
businesses based in the Basque Country and Navarre31.  
 
 
  
                                                     
30 (Text extracted from: “Counterterrorism: An Example of Co-operation”, speech pronounced at the Seminar on The role of 
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in combating terrorism, Feb. 22nd, 2002). 
31 For a detailed investigation of ETA’s network and its financing system see Buesa (2011) and Buesa and Baumert (2013). 
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Appendix 2: Alternative estimation strategies 
Table A1: Impact of terrorism on perceived tax enforcement. 
Ordered Logit Models (1994-2013). Interaction Foral. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Perceived 
Enforcement 
Perceived 
Enforcement 
Perceived 
Enforcement 
Perceived 
Enforcement 
Perceived 
Enforcement 
      
Truce -0.031     
 (-0.909)     
Truce×Foral 0.330***     
 (4.098)     
Comp_Terr_IM  -0.000    
  (-0.057)    
Comp_Terr_IM×Foral   -0.032***    
  (-2.593)    
Comp_Terr_IC   0.003   
   (1.443)   
Comp_Terr_IC×Foral    -0.002   
   (-0.539)   
Annual_Killings_province    0.001  
    (0.056)  
Annual_Killings_province×Foral    -0.085***  
    (-3.605)  
Extortion (in Foral Provinces)     -0.007 
     (-0.442) 
Foral -0.602*** -0.243** -0.549*** -0.292*** -0.496*** 
 (-8.832) (-2.554) (-8.894) (-3.279) (-5.386) 
Linear Combinations      
Truce +Truce×Foral 0.299***     
 (3.60)     
Comp_Terr_IM +Comp_Terr_IM×Foral  -0.032**    
  (-2.60)    
Comp_Terr_IC +Comp_Terr_IC×Foral 0.001   
   (0.29)   
Annual_Killings_province +Annual_Killings_province×Foral  -0.084***  
    (-4.17)  
Observations 40755 40755 40755 40755 39751 
Log likelihood -47049.353 -47045.678 -47063.462 -46984.323 -46219.275 
Wald chi2 (All variables) 4627.979 4672.693 3178.987 11816.392 3318.701 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Test for the equality of the cut-points (H0: w1=w2) 
Wald chi2 20425.65 20421.68 20456.51 20404.18 19955.87 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Test for the equality of the cut-points (H0: w2=w3) 
Wald chi2 15595.64 15580.12 15819.36 15588.18 15348.47 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each model includes Individual Characteristics, Contextual-level characteristics, 
Provincial fixed effects and Time Trends. Individual Characteristics include sex, age, level of education , civil status, dummy variable for head of household, 
job market status, dummy for self-employed, branch of activity and political views (leftist voter and nationalist voter dummies). Contextual-level 
characteristics include dummy for right government, per-capita GDP, population. 
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Table A2: Impact of terrorism on perceived tax enforcement. 
Ordered Logit Models (1994-2013). Interaction Foral & Self Employed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Perceived 
Enforcement 
Perceived 
Enforcement 
Perceived 
Enforcement 
Perceived 
Enforcement 
Perceived 
Enforcement 
Truce -0.032     
 (-0.931)     
Truce×Foral 0.282***     
 (3.383)     
Truce×Foral×SE 0.327*     
 (1.933)     
Comp_Terr_IM  -0.000    
  (-0.065)    
Comp_Terr_IM×Foral   -0.024*    
  (-1.909)    
Comp_Terr_IM×Foral×SE   -0.051**    
  (-2.526)    
Comp_Terr_IC   0.003   
   (1.506)   
Comp_Terr_IC×Foral    0.002   
   (0.635)   
Comp_Terr_IC×Foral×SE    -0.031***   
   (-4.354)   
Killings_province    0.001  
    (0.058)  
Killings_province×Foral    -0.081***  
    (-3.308)  
Killings_province×Foral×SE    -0.017  
    (-0.355)  
Extortion (in Foral)     -0.005 
     (-0.276) 
Extortion (in Foral)×SE     -0.080 
     (-1.597) 
Foral -0.603*** -0.243** -0.543*** -0.292*** -0.495*** 
 (-8.844) (-2.550) (-8.782) (-3.280) (-5.380) 
SE 0.129*** 0.147*** 0.153*** 0.146*** 0.109** 
 (4.916) (5.580) (5.862) (5.596) (2.239) 
Linear Combinations      
Truce+Truce×Foral+Truce×Foral×SE 0.577***     
 (3.42)     
Comp_Terr_IM+Comp_Terr_IM×Foral+Comp_Terr_IM×Foral×SE -0.075***    
  (-3.49)    
Comp_Terr_IC+Comp_Terr_IC×Foral+Comp_Terr_IC×Foral×SE -0.025***   
   (-3.41)   
Killings_province + Killings_province×Foral +Killings_province×Foral×SE -0.097**  
  (-2.21)  
Extortion (in Foral)+ Extortion (in Foral)×SE   -0.084* 
     (-1.69) 
Observations 40755 40755 40755 40755 39751 
Log likelihood -47047.518 -47041.857 -47053.861 -46984.262 -46218.347 
Wald chi2 (All variables) 4682.104 4573.557 3198.190 11804.676 3302.779 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Test for the equality of the cut-points (H0: w1=w2) 
Wald chi2 20421.22 20428.67 20454.69 20404.63 19956.17 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Test for the equality of the cut-points (H0: w2=w3) 
Wald chi2 15597.57 15578.72 15819.91 15587.94 15348.21 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each model includes Individual Characteristics, Contextual-level characteristics, 
Provincial fixed effects and Time Trends. Individual Characteristics include sex, age, level of education , civil status, dummy variable for head of household, 
job market status, dummy for self-employed, branch of activity and political views (leftist voter and nationalist voter dummies). Contextual-level 
characteristics include dummy for right government, per-capita GDP, population. 
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